We participate at AoIR2024 «Industry» 30 October – 2 November 2024 • University of Sheffield (TUoS) and Sheffield Hallam University (SHU), Sheffield, UK with the paper: Monetizing fringe beliefs: italian telegram spaces as earning engines
MONETIZING FRINGE BELIEFS: ITALIAN TELEGRAM SPACES AS EARNING ENGINES
Introduction
The current digital landscape is characterized by a constellation of public, semi-public and private spaces (Boccia Artieri et al. 2021) connected by mutual migration dynamics. What is still unclear and under-researched, is the relationship between what may be defined as “fringe platforms” and the more mainstream web spaces as well as legacy media. The paper presented is a step of a broader research project (CORIT), funded by the Next Generation EU Program, concerning the development of narratives that are capable of “intoxicating” the Italian hybrid media system. While the goal of CORIT project is to understand Italian contemporary public spheres, analyzing the relation between fringe and mainstream media environments, this paper focuses on one aspect in particular: the monetization dynamics occurring in such fringe spaces.
Telegram as a fringe platform
According to de Winkel (2023), fringe platforms are described as alternative platform services created with the intention to critique the ideological foundations and practices of mainstream platform services. Furthermore, the author suggests fringe platforms should not be exclusively linked to extreme politics but encompass various technologies reflecting diverse ideologies. Fringe platforms, with a smaller user base, foster tighter ideological bonds, potentially exposing users to toxicity (Schulze et al. 2022) and spreading problematic content to mainstream media.
In this sense, Telegram is perceived as a fringe space due to its flexibility in distributing problematic content through semi-public channels, closed groups, and chats. To some extent, the platform appears to function as a conduit for disseminating information across various networks and platforms, thus amplifying the reach of its content. Indeed Telegram has positioned itself as optimal environment for individuals seeking privacy and security, characteristics that render it conducive to the exploration of information and contexts where conspiracy narratives grow (Schulze et al., 2022; Herasimenka et al., 2022). In particular, research conducted on Telegram has shown that within such spaces, alt-right conspiracist groups coordinate (Walther and McCoy 2021), and in general, disinformation spreads (Herasimenka et al. 2022). Although research on disinformation covers diverse topics such as media manipulation (Marwick and Lewis, 2017; van Dijck et al. 2023), an emerging area of study focuses on the digital platforms that enable the dissemination and monetization of disinformation.
Demonetization and affective support
Various forms of monetization, i.e. alternative monetization (Hua et al., 2022), introduce an additional financial incentive for content creation and have the potential to impact the growth of a channel. Considering how the value of online content is determined by its level of engagement due to its potential for monetization, platforms establish regulations that dictate the acceptability of content, which content can be taken down, and when content creators may be deplatformed (Rogers, 2020). While platforms set forth their own standards, certain viewers gravitate towards fringe channels, providing content creators with alternative norms for assessing and monetizing content in manners that deviate from the platform’s directives (Marwick et al. 2022). The act of demonetization strengthens the populist notion of anti-elitism, portraying the powerful as greedy and the commoners as financially deprived (Castanho Silva et al. 2017). Thus, mainstream platforms are seen as gatekeepers of financial gains while demonetized creators become those who are forced to free labor for their communities. This, then, resonates with what Eslen-Ziya (2019), defines as hybrid emotional echo-chambers as in such spaces this frustration due to inequality and lack of means is deeply intertwined with the collective identity of the group. Moreover, believing in misinformation activates emotional rather than cognitive dynamics (Sanchez & Dunning, 2021): in such spaces proximal viewpoints are presented with a positive emotional load, reinforcing negative feelings and hostility toward those referred to as out-groups. Therefore, the fusion of emotions with ideologies intensifies the dissemination of such content, but it also may play a key role in the financial support dynamics for producers, as it happens within politically mobilized extremist groups (Wade et al. 2023).
Research questions and methodology
Building on these premises, our study addresses a main research question and two sub-research questions:
R.Q.: Do fringe online communities, that define themselves in an anti-mainstream perspective, seek to differentiate themselves from the mainstream also through their monetization methods?
R.Q. 1: What monetization methods are present in these fringe communities?
R.Q. 2: Do these monetization methods become topics of discussion within the groups?
To approach these questions, we started from lists of Telegram channels/groups compiled by debunkers (Fletcher et al. 2018). From this initial list, we built a network of the main Italian Telegram channels and groups that disseminate problematic content through a snowballing method (Peeters & Willaert, 2022). Then, using a combination of ethnographic observation and scraping tools such as 4Cat and the Telethon Python library (Urman & Katz, 2020) we collected and analyzed 1) posts with news and corresponding comments, 2) any mention of monetization or funding, 3) any reference to content from the same group/channel on other platforms and media (i.e. YouTube videos, radio interviews etc.). The use of ethnographic observation played a crucial role in identifying the keywords for searching the content. It also helped to highlight the emic categories used by the group to legitimize various forms of monetization.
Preliminary results and expected outcomes
Although the ethnography and data collection on the selected groups and channels will continue until June 2024, we can already draw a number of substantive considerations. Firstly, it emerges how an understanding of terms such as “fringe” and “deplatforming” is necessary. While the existing literature has partly touched on the ambiguity of these concepts, there is a need to clarify the degree to which the referred groups are actually “peripheral” or “unseen”. The research has identified various interrelation dynamics between the analyzed spaces and the “mainstream” public sphere. These are some of the ways in which such interrelations happen:
- Technically: despite being more limited than other platforms, these spaces are affected by inbound and outbound cross-platform circulation of content.
- Economically: Various monetization methods we found seem to align with the platformization of mainstream cultural production (Poell et al., 2021) and present elements of aspirational labor practices (Duffy, 2016).
- By sourcing: these communities consistently import and comment sources from mainstream media, supporting the hypothesis that they form emotional rather informational echo-chambers (Eslen-Ziya et al., 2019) from framing these sources as “outgroup identifiers” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2024), often using informational strategies such as sharing screenshots instead of the source links (Zurovac, 2023).
- Through cultural lexicon: lexicons and representations developed in these groups find resonance in highly visible media content as well as more visible public figures on television (journalists, “alternative” intellectuals, local and national politicians).
- Through visibility exchange: less conspicuous, fringe spaces cultivate subcultural fame, spawning “anti-mainstream” political experts and alternative lifestyles’ proponents. Contrary to what the terms “fringe” and “deplatforming” might suggest, some personalities accumulate a visibility capital that extends beyond Telegram.
Monetization strategies observed so far do not seem to mark a specific difference with the monetisation modalities prevalent within mainstream platforms and creators. Four main strategies emerged: 1) self-financing, group or individual asking for a voluntary donation to “keep the service alive”, 2) digital patronage, “premium” services such as special contents and consultancy, 3) the sale of products and merchandising, 4) “shady deals”, when the request for money is linked to the offer of investments whose returns are not transparent or guaranteed.
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